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HE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS PUBLICLY CONDEMNED
torture through its policy commitments and congres-
sional legislation. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
has stated, “The United States Government does not
authorize or condone torture of detainees. Torture, and conspiracy
to commit torture, are crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may
occur in the world.”1 President Bush has also claimed that the
United States does not torture.2 Congress has prohibited torture
under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,3 the Torture
Statute,4 and the McCain Amendment.5 Despite executive state-
ments condemning torture and firm legislative prohibitions,
President George W. Bush attached a signing statement to the
McCain Amendment that states, “The Executive Branch shall con-
strue … the Act … in a manner consistent with the constitution-
al authority of the President to supervise the unitary Executive
Branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the con-
stitutional limitations on the judicial power.”6 This signing state-
ment relies on the president’s Commander-in-Chief power to
undermine domestic legislation and treaty provisions prohibiting
the torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of
detainees in U.S. custody. Other signing statements further threat-
en compliance with domestic and international prohibitions
against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
This article examines the impact of signing statements on
legal prohibitions against torture, beginning with an account of
the historical origin of signing statements. It proceeds to explain
the constitutional arguments justifying the use of signing state-
ments as a legal extension of the president’s Commander-in-Chief
power. After presenting the legal framework, this article focuses on
three instances where the executive has attempted to limit the
scope of domestic legislation prohibiting torture: (1) the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991; (2) the Torture Statute, the imple-
menting legislation for the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; and (3) the McCain Amendment. This article con-
cludes by examining how signing statements, as an improper exer-
cise of presidential Commander-in-Chief power, erode U.S. com-
pliance with established international legal bans against torture.
Signing statements that limit the scope and applicability of U.S.
and international law violate domestic prohibitions against torture
and threaten U.S. adherence to its international treaty obligations.
Reinterpretations of the universal prohibition against torture pose
a grave danger to the continued strength of well-established
human rights principles.
The History of Presidential Signing Statements
Scholars have classified presidential signing statements into
three distinct categories: (1) constitutional signing statements that
note constitutional defects in legislation; (2) political signing state-
ments that define ambiguous sections of a bill; and (3) rhetorical
signing statements that draw the public’s attention to positive or
negative aspects of legislation.7 Constitutional signing statements,
the focus of this article, are an expression of how the president
plans to interpret and enforce a law passed by Congress. Signing
statements may therefore affect the application of legislation both
domestically and internationally. 
James Monroe issued the first signing statement, which
argued that “the President, not Congress, bore the constitutional
responsibility of appointing [military] officers.”8 Just over a dozen
signing statements were issued before 1981.9 The strategic use of
signing statements increased rapidly during the Reagan adminis-
tration. President Reagan challenged 71 legislative provisions,
President George H.W. Bush challenged 232, and President
Clinton challenged 140.10 The figures for President George W.
Bush vary, with administration officials citing 11011 challenges and
some scholars identifying up to 807.12 President George W. Bush
has only vetoed one piece of legislation throughout his tenure,
implying that he is using signing statements in lieu of his veto
powers.13
President Reagan based his increased use of signing state-
ments on a 1986 Justice Department memorandum authored by
Samuel Alito.14 Alito asserted, “Since the president’s approval is
just as important as that of the House or Senate, it seems to follow
that the president’s understanding of the bill should be just as
important as that of Congress.”15 As the American Bar Association
recognized in its critique of signing statements, “For the first time,
signing statements were viewed as a strategic weapon in a cam-
paign to influence the way legislation was interpreted by the courts
and Executive agencies as well as their more traditional use to pre-
serve Presidential prerogatives.”16
The Clinton administration also supported signing state-
ments. A 1993 Office of Legal Counsel opinion addressing the
legal significance of signing statements noted their utility for
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(1) explaining to the public, and particularly to constituencies
interested in the bill, what the President believes to be the like-
ly effects of its adoption, (2) directing subordinate officers with-
in the Executive Branch how to interpret or administer the
enactment, and (3) informing Congress and the public that the
Executive believes that a particular provision would be uncon-
stitutional in certain of its applications, or that it is unconstitu-
tional on its face, and that the provision will not be given effect
by the Executive Branch to the extent that such enforcement
would create an unconstitutional condition.17
The opinion focused on the distinction between these appar-
ently valid uses of signing statements and their more questionable
use “to create legislative history to which the courts are expected to
give some weight when construing the enactment.”18
In 1994 Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger
authored a memorandum clarifying that the president should “sus-
tain a particular provision as constitutional” if he believes that the
courts would uphold that provision.19 The memorandum empha-
sized the importance of weighing the effect of compliance with a
provision on the constitutional rights of individuals with the exec-
utive’s constitutional authority, as well as whether compliance or
noncompliance would facilitate judicial resolution.20 Later inter-
pretations concluded that if a “law were not struck down [by the
courts], the President would have no choice but to enforce it.”21
Constitutional Justifications for 
the Use of Signing Statements
Presidents have relied on Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution to support their use of signing statements. Article II,
Section 3 states that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” Proponents of the use of signing statements
rely on this constitutional provision to the exclusion of Article I,
which gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its] powers.”
Further, Article III empowers the judiciary to determine all “Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties.” Marbury v. Madison solidified the
power of judicial review by acknowledging the judiciary’s constitu-
tional duty to “say what the law is.”22 The president’s duty to exe-
cute laws in accordance with the Constitution should not render
meaningless Congress’ power to legislate and the judiciary’s power
to interpret the law.
Proponents of signing statements argue that the president
cannot enforce unconstitutional laws.23 Walter Dellinger’s 1993
opinion for the Office of Legal Counsel stated that such practice is
similar to judicial action construing legislation in a manner that
adheres to the Constitution.24 Although the Executive should not
enforce unconstitutional laws, presidential signing statements are
misleading because the president has already signed the legislation,
often praising Congress and the drafters of the legislation.
Commentators have observed that “[t]he President, through his
signing statement, can shade the meaning of the language voted
upon by Congress.… Under the guise of signing statements used
to interpret the acts of Congress, the President can state his objec-
tions to a bill in the form of interpretations without fear of contra-
diction by Congress.”25 According to the Constitution, the presi-
dent’s role in the legislative process is limited to proposing legisla-
tion or vetoing proposed legislation.26 The presidential signing
statement therefore functions much like the constitutionally pro-
hibited line-item veto.27
The current administration has relied heavily on the presi-
dent’s Commander-in-Chief power to justify signing statements.
Article II, Section 2 states, “The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States.” Various signing statements call for the execu-
tion of legislation “in a manner consistent with the President’s con-
stitutional authority as Commander in Chief.”28 In their reliance
on the president’s Commander-in-Chief power, proponents of sign-
ing statements ignore Congress’ broad constitutional authority to
control numerous aspects of foreign affairs and national security.29
Signing statements that rely on the president’s Commander-
in-Chief power have resulted in the virtual nullification of certain
legislation. For example, one signing statement declared legislation
forbidding U.S. troops in Colombia from participating in combat
against rebels as “advisory in nature.” Another signing statement
argued that military lawyers must follow legal conclusions reached
by the Justice Department and the Pentagon when giving advice to
their commanders despite legislation prohibiting Defense
Department personnel from interfering with such communication.
Another signing statement attempted to discard requirements that
the Pentagon ensure that military prison guards remain informed
of the requirements for humane treatment under the Geneva
Conventions. Yet another signing statement claimed that the pres-
ident could bypass laws requiring notice to Congress before the
diversion of money for secret operations, including “black sites”
that secretly imprison suspected terrorists.30 Signing statements
that claim the express will of Congress is “advisory,” limit judicial
subject matter jurisdiction, or directly contradict congressional will
threaten the separation of powers. As former U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Jackson recognized in his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, presidential action that contravenes the
express or implied will of Congress poses a threat to the “equilibri-
um established by our constitutional system.”31
The Bush administration’s emphasis on the president’s
Commander-in-Chief power reveals a broader goal to expand execu-
tive influence in foreign affairs and national security. As one com-
mentator has observed, “This administration … considers that it
does exercise the prerogative power and certainly in any area that
touches on foreign, military, national security, or intelligence poli-
cy.”32 Although the courts have confirmed the need for deference to
the executive in these contexts, “a state of war is not a blank check for
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”33
Signing Statements and Torture Prohibitions
President George H.W. Bush’s Signing Statement
for the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
On March 12, 1992, President George H.W. Bush attached a
signing statement to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.34
This statement strongly condemned torture wherever it may
occur35 and called upon Congress to pass legislation implementing
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Despite his
condemnation of acts of torture wherever they may occur,
President Bush argued that aliens could “misuse” the statute to lit-
igate against other aliens in U.S. courts, thereby overburdening the
U.S. legal system. President Bush further stated, “I must note that
I am signing the bill based on my understanding that the Act does
not permit suits for alleged human rights violations in the context
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of United States military operations abroad or law enforcement
actions…. I do not believe it is the Congress’ intent that H.R.
2092 should apply to United States Armed Forces or law enforce-
ment operations.…”36 President Bush’s statement, when read in its
entirety, sought to limit remedies afforded by the Act to U.S.
nationals tortured by foreign states or their officials. Such an inter-
pretation appears paradoxical given the president’s broad and
apparently universal proscription of torture in the opening para-
graph to the signing statement. 
The Torture Statute and Attempts to Limit its
Scope
In 1994 Congress enacted the Torture Statute,37 the imple-
menting legislation for the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Convention). The Torture Statute imposes criminal
penalties on U.S. nationals or any other individual present in the
United States who, acting under color of law, “intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”38 Penalties under the
Torture Statute range from 20 years of jail time to the death penal-
ty depending upon whether the victim died as a result of the pro-
hibited conduct.
A 2002 memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R.
Gonzales, then-Counsel to President George W. Bush, interpreted
the Torture Statute to encompass the Convention’s definition of
torture, as well as U.S. reservations to the Convention.39 U.S.
reservations to the Convention include a limitation on cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment to “the cruel, unusual and inhu-
mane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth,
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.”40 Alberto
R. Gonzales has interpreted this reservation as limiting the protec-
tions afforded to U.S. citizens under the Convention.41
The Bybee memorandum also limited the definition of tor-
ture to “[p]hysical pain … equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death.”42 The memoran-
dum emphasized the president’s Commander-in-Chief power to
conclude that “in the circumstances of the current war against al
Qaeda and its allies, prosecution under [the Torture Statute] may
be barred because enforcement of the statute would represent an
unconstitutional infringement of the President’s authority to con-
duct war.”43 In 2004 a replacement memorandum concluded,
“Because the discussion in that memorandum concerning the
President’s Commander-in-Chief power … was — and remains —
unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows.”44
It is questionable whether removal of the Commander-in-Chief
analysis “was prompted because the reasoning was wrong or because
it was not necessary for the purpose of the original opinion.”45
President George W. Bush’s Signing Statement for
the McCain Amendment Prohibiting Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
In December 2005 Congress amended the Department of
Defense’s 2006 Appropriations Act and established the United
States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation as the
authoritative standard for the interrogation of individuals “in the
custody or under the effective control of the Department of
Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility.”46
The McCain Amendment sought to address any arguments justi-
fying geographical limitations on the explicit prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.47
President George W. Bush attached a signing statement to the
McCain Amendment limiting federal subject matter jurisdiction over
applications for writs of habeas corpus for so-called enemy combat-
ants.48 The signing statement concluded, “The executive branch shall
construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President
to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in
Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on judicial
power.” Under President Bush’s interpretation, “it is for the president
— not Congress or the courts — to determine when the provisions
of [the McCain Amendment] interfere with his war-making powers,
and when they do, he will freely ignore the law.”49
Placing emphasis on the president’s Commander-in-Chief
power undermines legislative action to prohibit torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. For example, the executive’s
broad invocation of power under Article II of the U.S.
Constitution limits the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, the
Torture Statute, and the McCain Amendment by placing actions
that implicate foreign affairs or national security within the exclu-
sive control of the executive. When faced with unambiguous legis-
lation, signing statements that offer alternate interpretations of the
law flout the will of Congress and threaten the separation of pow-
ers. Any attempt to re-write unambiguous congressional legislation
also threatens the judiciary’s power to “say what the law is.”50
Implications for U.S. Obligations 
under International Law
In addition to undermining domestic legislation, signing
statements that weaken prohibitions against torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment also violate well-established
international law norms. Presidents can use signing statements to
undermine compliance with U.S. treaty obligations. Certain
treaties are directly enforceable in U.S. courts. For example, the
United States is obligated to adhere to the requirements imposed
under the Geneva Conventions that prohibit torture and humili-
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“President Bush declared: ‘It is for the president — not Congress
or the courts — to determine when the provisions of the
McCain Amendment interfere with his war-making powers, and 
when they do, he will freely ignore the law.’”
ating and degrading treatment.51 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s holding that the Geneva
Conventions did not create a private right of action and held that
Common Article 3 applies to the conflict with Al-Qaeda.52
Signing statements that offer alternative interpretations of these
prohibitions violate the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. 
Signing statements also undermine compliance with domes-
tic legislation that implements international prohibitions against
torture. The Torture Statute, the implementing legislation for the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, created crimi-
nal penalties for individuals who “commit or attempt to commit”
torture.53 The president is acting contrary to the will of Congress
when he issues signing statements offering alternative interpreta-
tions of Congress’ unambiguous prohibition against torture. As
Justice Jackson argued in Youngstown, “When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.”54
Further, signing statements frustrate U.S. compliance with
international norms prohibiting torture. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. As the Supreme
Court noted in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, however, “Several times
… the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the
task of interpreting and applying international human rights law,
as when its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the doc-
ument were not self-executing.”55 Although the ICCPR is a non-
self-executing treaty, it embodies norms recognized by the interna-
tional community. Attempts to undermine these norms places the
United States in contravention of international will.
In addition to threatening U.S. treaty obligations, signing state-
ments weaken U.S. compliance with customary international law,
which arguably forms a part of federal common law56 and is there-
fore enforceable in U.S. courts.57 Customary international law con-
sists of widely accepted state practice stemming from a sense of legal
obligation.58 States are bound by customary international law unless
they are persistent objectors during the formation of a norm of cus-
tomary international law.59 To avoid its obligations under customary
international law, the United States could argue that it is a persistent
objector or that the war on terror is a “new” type of war around
which new norms of customary international law are developing.60
The U.S. government has argued that cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment is not a norm of customary international law
because such treatment does not rise to the level of torture. The
Bybee memorandum, for example, concludes that “certain acts
may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain
and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within [the Torture
Statute’s] proscription against torture.”61 In addition, U.S. courts
have limited the enforcement of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment based on the belief that it does not reach the level of cus-
tomary international law: “the prohibition … poses more complex
problems of definition than are presented by norms forbidding
torture, summary execution, disappearance or arbitrary deten-
tion.”62 Signing statements further threaten the enforcement of
legislation prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
by relying on military necessity and the president’s Commander-
in-Chief power. U.S. state practice, therefore, contradicts the norm
of customary international law prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment63 and opens the door to legal arguments that
the United States is a persistent objector to the prohibition.64
It is worth noting that regardless of U.S. state practice, certain
norms are non-derogable. These jus cogens norms are binding on all
states, regardless of whether they are persistent objectors during the
formation of a norm of customary international law.65 Well-estab-
lished principles of international law expressly prohibit any
attempt to remove executive action from the scope of these prohi-
bitions.66 Thus, presidential signing statements that implicitly
authorize torture, a jus cogens norm, violate international law. 
Conclusion
U.S. presidents have historically relied on signing statements
to modify the application and reinterpret the meaning of national
statutes and international treaties. Some legal scholars and admin-
istration officials have upheld signing statements as a viable means
for articulating presidential understanding of legislation and for
guiding judicial interpretation of legislation. 
History aside, President George W. Bush’s use of signing state-
ments threatens to undermine unambiguous domestic and interna-
tional prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing treatment. Consequently, President Bush’s signing statements
jeopardize an individual’s right to be protected from egregious human
rights violations. The president cannot invoke his Commander-in-
Chief power to justify the reinterpretation of domestic legislation to
conflict with international legal standards prohibiting torture.
Recent signing statements invite the reinterpretation of treaty
norms, which the United States has a duty to uphold under the
Constitution, and customary international law norms, which are
part of the federal common law. The United States therefore risks
violating both domestic and international law by acting in contra-
vention of these well-established prohibitions. The president can-
not justify actions that are contrary to domestic and international
obligations. To do so would give the president the power to “easi-
ly contrive a constitutional excuse to decline enforcement of any
law he deplored, and transform his qualified veto into a monarch-
like absolute veto.” HRB
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“The president’s
Commander-in-Chief power
is not a valid justification 
for reinterpreting domestic
legislation prohibiting 
conduct that is recognized
throughout the world 
community as illegal.”
25
1 U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks Upon her Departure for Europe,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm (Dec. 5, 2005).
2 BBCNews, U.S. does not torture, Bush insists,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4415132.stm (Nov. 7, 2005). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note). The TVPA permits civil suits in the United States
against individuals who act under color of foreign law to perpetrate acts of
torture.
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
5 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1001, 119 Stat.
2739 (McCain Amendment). The McCain Amendment both recognizes the
U.S. Army Field Manual as the authority on interrogation techniques by the
Department of Defense and expressly prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of individuals under custody or control of the U.S.
government.
6 Statement by President of the United States, Statement by President George
Bush upon Signing H.R. 2863, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. S50 (Dec. 30, 2005).
7 See Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing
Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton 3-5 (Apr. 3-6, 2003); Phillip J. Coop-
er, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the use and abuse of presidential sign-
ing statements, 35 Presidential Studies Quarterly 3, 516-17 (Sept. 1, 2005).
8 Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing Statement at 5.
9 Andrew Sullivan, Time, “We Don’t Need a New King George” (Jan. 19,
2006), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1149361,00.html.
10 See American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing State-
ments and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Recommendation 11, 14 (Aug.
2006), available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04
/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/.
11 Michelle E. Boardman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement before the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, United States Senate, on Presidential Signing Statements (June 27,
2006). 
12 Charlie Savage, Boston Globe, “Bush blocked probe, AG testifies; Senate
examines wiretap program” (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.boston.
com/news/nation/articles/2006/07/19/bush_blocked_probe_ag_testifies/.
13 On July 19, 2006, President Bush issued his first veto of the Stem Cell
Research Enhancement Act of 2005. See George W. Bush, Message to the
House of Representatives (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060719-5.html.
14 Marc V. Garber and Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as
Interpretatiosn of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24
Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 367 (1987).
15 Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Memorandum to Litigation Strategy Working Group, Using Presi-
dential Signing Statement to Make Fuller Use of the President’s Constitutionally
Assigned Role in the Process of Enacting Law (Feb. 5, 1986).
16 American Bar Association, “Recommendation” at 10.
17 Walter Dellinger, Opinion of the Office of Legal Council, Memorandum
for Bernard M. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of
Presidential Signing Statements (Nov. 3, 1993). 
18 Id.
19 Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for the Hon-
orable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to
Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm. 
20 Id.
21 American Bar Association, “Recommendation” 13-14, citing Special White
House Briefing on Provision in the FY1996 Defense Authorization Bill Relat-
ing to HIV-positive Armed Services Members, Federal News Service (Feb. 9,
1996) and Allison Mitchell, New York Times, “President Finds a Way to Fight
Mandate to Oust H.I.V. Troops” (Feb. 10, 1996).
22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
23 See Dellinger, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements. 
24 Id. at 6. 
25 Garber and Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of
Legislative Intent at 375-76.
26 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2. 
27 See generally Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
28 See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2863.
29 See Savage, “Bush challenges hundreds of laws.”
30 See generally Charlie Savage, Boston Globe, “Examples of the president’s
signing statements,” http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/
04/30/examples_of_the_presidents_signing_statements/ (Apr. 30, 2006).
31 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952).
32 Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the use and abuse of presiden-
tial signing statements.
33 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
34 Statement by President of the United States, Statement by President George
Bush upon Signing H.R. 2092, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 91 (Mar. 12, 1992).
35 President Bush states, “The United States must continue its vigorous efforts
to bring the practice of torture and other gross abuses of human rights to an
end wherever they occur.” 
36 Id.
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
38 Id.
39 Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/memos_dir/memo_200
20801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf#search=%22torture%20memo%22 (Bybee mem-
orandum). 
40 U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990).
41 Amnesty International, United States of America, “Guantánamo and beyond:
The continuing pursuit of unchecked executive power,” http://web.amnesty.
org/library/Index/ENGAMR510832005?open&of=ENG-IRQ (May 13, 2005).
42 The Bybee memorandum asserted that “[f ]or purely mental pain or suffer-
ing to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant psy-
chological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”
43 Id. at 2.
44 Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General, Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004).
45 Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President be Torturer in Chief?, 81 Ind. L.J.
1145, 1151 (2006).
46 McCain Amendment, 119 Stat. 2739.. 
47 See generally 13 No. 2 Hum. Rts. Brief 39-40 (2006). 
48 Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2863.
49 Dahlia Lithwick, Presidential signing statements are more than just executive
branch lunacy, http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2134919
(Jan. 30, 2006).
50 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
52 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793-98 (2006).
53 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 -2340(A).
54 343 U.S. at 637. 
55 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
56 The Supreme Court recognized in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900), that “[i]nternational law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”
ENDNOTES: Reinterpreting Torture
endnotes continued on page 43
43
57 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a private right of action exists
under federal common law in certain instances: “[W]e are persuaded that fed-
eral courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and accept-
ance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the
Alien Tort Claims Act] was enacted.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
58 See generally Jordan J. Paust, The Significance and Determination of Custom-
ary International Human Rights Law: The Complex Nature, Sources and Evi-
dences of Customary Human Rights, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 147 (1996).
59 See Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18, 1951). The
International Court of Justice held that a possible customary international law
norm would be “inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.”
60 One article noted, “if the United States consistently rejects the inclusion of
a terrorist organization under Common Article 3, should such an inclusion
become customary international law, the persistent objector doctrine indicates
that the law would not bind the United States, unless it evolves into a jus
cogens norm.” “Executive Power – Military Commissions – D.C. Circuit
Upholds the Constitutionality of Military Commissions for Guantánamo Bay
Detainees. – Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), Cert. Granted,
126 S. CT. 622 (2005),” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, n. 53 (Mar. 2006).
61 Bybee memorandum at 1.
62 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995).
lxiv Professor Robert Goldman argues that “[a]lthough cruel, degrading, or
inhuman treatment is … clearly prohibited by customary law, its status as jus
cogens remains unclear.” Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal Counsel’s
2002 Opinion Letter and International Law Against Torture, 12 No. 1 Hum.
Rts. Brief 1 (2006). See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 5,
signed Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222. Both the American Convention on Human Rights and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
64 Scholars debate whether customary international law stems from a state’s
policies or how a state acts in practice; therefore, whether executive and judi-
cial action as opposed to congressional policy would form state practice is
questionable. But see Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities
In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 185. 
65 According to Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law School, “the implica-
tions are clear: Under U.S. law, the President may not, on his own constitu-
tional authority, violate a jus cogens norm such those against torture or slavery
or genocide.”
66 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984.
67 See American Bar Association, Recommendation 11, 14.
ENDNOTES: Reinterpreting Torture continued from page 25
